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Abstract
This paper develops the idea that obsolescence acts as an incen-
tive device to provide quality for experience goods. The argument
is that obsolescence aﬀects the frequency at which consumers repur-
chase products and may punish producers for a lack of quality. A
higher rate of obsolescence enables a ﬁrm to convince its consumers
that it provides high quality. We identify a trade–oﬀ between quality
and durability, implying that the two are substitutes. This leads to
excessive obsolescence. The ineﬃciency is due to unobservability and
not monopolistic distortions. The theory follows naturally from the
theory of repeated games.
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11 Introduction
”The iPod is an example of the kind of poor design and obsoles-
cence that’s occurring in the electronics industry” - Shelia Davis
of the Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition.1
In October, 2001, Apple introduced its most successful product ever, the
iPod, a highly portable digital audio player. Consumers praise the iPod for
its ease of operation and design. Yet, in one important dimension the iPod’s
quality has been lacking: durability. In 2003 Apple acknowledges that the
iPod’s battery has a limited lifetime and is irreplaceable. After its failure
consumers need to buy a new device, or use Apple’s out–of–warranty battery
replacement program for $99 dollars.2 The company defends its high fee by
explaining that, by design, it is cheaper to exchange the physical device than
to replace only the battery.
This raises the question why Apple, with its high concern for quality in
other dimensions, has chosen to limit the device’s lifetime with something as
simple as an irreplaceable battery. Although consumers are now well aware
of the limited lifetime, Apple remains ardently committed to the irreplace-
able battery and excessive replacement costs: also newer iPod versions have
irreplaceable batteries. As a response, multiple third parties have started
selling iPod battery replacement kits.3 Yet, Apple’s commitment to the irre-
placeable battery remains unbroken. In its recent iPod Nano version, Apple
solders the battery to the device and, in the new Video iPod, the battery is
physically aﬃxed to the metal backplate. This makes a replacement by the
consumer all but impossible.
The iPod’s irreplaceable battery is an example of planned obsolescence
and suggests that the iPod is an ineﬃcient product. This would make the
iPod’s success even more remarkable and raises questions about market eﬃ-
ciency. How come that an ineﬃcient product may thrive, let alone survive,
in a market as competitive as the market for audio players? Why doesn’t
1http://www.detnews.com/2005/technology/0503/09/A08-111726.htm.
2Originally, the replacement cost 250 dollars (http://www.ipodsdirtysecret.com). In
August 2005, Apple reduced the price from $99 to $59 dollars.
3Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPod#Battery life
2the competition drive the iPod from the market by oﬀering a similar product
with a more eﬃcient lifetime? Competitors have indeed tried to do so. For
instance, the most distinguishable feature in Creative’s advertisement of its
”Nomad Jukebox Zen NX” audio player was the ”removeable, high–capacity
Li-ion battery”.4 Why have the market’s attempts to correct the iPod’s in-
eﬃcient levels of durability been unfruitful? This paper provides an answer
to these questions. It develops a new, simple theory of planned obsoles-
cence which argues that reduced durability may actually be in the interest
of consumers: Planned obsolescence strengthens the producer’s incentives to
provide adequate quality in other dimensions than durability alone. In the
case of the iPod, it helps Apple to maintain its highly acclaimed standards
in design and ease of operation.
The explanation is as follows. Consider a producer who produces a good
with an endogenous quality level that becomes only observable to a buyer
after consumption. If the producer and buyer meet only once, the producer
does not have an incentive to deliver appropriate quality. Klein and Leﬄer
(1981) and Shapiro (1983), however, argue that when the producer produces
repeatedly, he may develop a reputation for high quality. Hence, repeated
interactions may lead to an appropriate provision of quality. The poten-
tial of reputation in providing quality depends on the frequency of these
interactions. Since obsolescence aﬀects this frequency, the reputation motive
provides a theory of planned obsolescence. This paper conﬁrms this idea
and demonstrates that it leads to a trade–oﬀ between durability and other
quality aspects.
The question of excessive obsolescence has been on the economists’ re-
search agenda for a long time and dates back to at least Wicksell (1923).
Focusing on monopolists, earlier theories concluded, quite surprisingly, that
the typical monopolist does not have an incentive to distort a product’s life-
time. This counter–intuitive result was ﬁrst shown by Swan (1970), who
demonstrates that, even though a monopolist has an incentive to distort the
quantity/price decision, he does not have an incentive to distort a product’s
lifetime. Schmalensee (1979) conﬁrms the robustness of Swan’s result and
4See http://www.nomadworld.com/products/jukebox zen nx/.
3concludes that, even for a monopoly setting, a convincing theory of planned
obsolescence requires a more elaborate setup. Such a setting is provided
by Bulow (1982, 1986), who argues that the time–inconsistency problem of a
durable monopolist identiﬁed in Coase (1972) induces a monopolist to choose
excessive obsolescence. Most subsequent work on the issue of excessive ob-
solescence uses this framework (e.g. Waldman 1993, Choi 1994, Waldman
1996, Ellison and Fudenberg 2000, and Nahm 2004).
This paper proposes a theory of planned obsolescence based on repeated
games rather than the time–inconsistency problem of Coase. It does not re-
quire the presence of a monopoly; it may also explain planned obsolescence
under competition. The crucial ingredient of the theory is an unobservabil-
ity of a quality characteristic diﬀerent from durability. In this respect, it
is related to Choi (2001), where ﬁrms may use observable durability as a
signal for unobservable quality. A fundamental diﬀerence is, however, that
in Choi’s framework reduced durability is a signal rather than an incentive
device. Moreover, Choi’s signalling idea requires that durability is observ-
able, whereas we explicitly show that this is not needed in our framework.
Our explanation also markedly diﬀers from Grout and Park (2005), who ar-
gue how planned obsolescence may promote a good’s secondary market and
therefore may arise even under competition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section sets up the
model in which we illustrate our arguments formally. In order to make our
arguments as transparent as possible, Section 3 studies ﬁrst a simpliﬁed ver-
sion of the model. Section 4 extends the analysis and explicitly demonstrates
how planned obsolescence also arises under less stringent assumptions such
as unobservable and costly durability. In the conclusion, we emphasize that
our idea behind planned obsolescence holds in much broader settings such as
word–of–mouth communication and relational contracting. Eﬀectively, our
idea is the simple observation that reduced durability raises the frequency of
economic interactions and, therefore, makes reputation more eﬀective.
42 The Setup
We illustrate our theory in the classical framework of durability as introduced
by Kleiman and Ophir (1966). A ﬁrm produces a good that is characterized
by a quality level q and a durability level d with the interpretation that a
good (q,d) yields a consumer a utility stream of q for d time units. That is,









where r is the common interest rate. Hence, we extend the durability frame-
work of Kleiman and Ophir by introducing an additional quality attribute q
that is diﬀerent from durability. In our theory, this second attribute will not
be directly observable. An example of an unobservable quality in the case
of Apple would be the iPod’s ease of operation, which consumers only learn
during the day–to–day use of the device. Yet, even the iPod’s design may
be seen as an unobservable quality attribute. Only over time consumers will
ﬁnd out that the design is a “classic” and does not become boring or runs
out of fashion.
There is a single consumer who requires at most one functioning unit of
the product. This non–crucial, simplifying assumption enables us to demon-
strate clearly the role of unobservable quality on the choice of durability.
In particular, it eliminates the eﬀect identiﬁed by Bulow (1982,1986) that
a producer may use planned obsolescence to mitigate the Coasian time–
inconsistency problem of a durable monopolist.
We make the following standard assumptions about the producer’s cost
function c(q,d). It is twice diﬀerentiable, weakly increasing in both q and d,




dd ≥ 0. In order to strengthen our
results, we assume that, from a productive perspective, quality and durability
are complements, c′′
qd ≤ 0. Moreover, a quality level of zero is costless to
provide and the marginal cost of quality at q = 0 is zero: c(0,d) = 0 and
c′
q(0,d) = 0 for all d ≥ 0. Consequently, there are no ﬁxed costs and the
average cost of quality is smaller than its marginal cost, c(q,d)/q < c′
q(q,d).
We further assume that the marginal cost of quality becomes inﬁnite at an
5inﬁnite level of quality: c′
q(∞,d) = ∞ for all d ≥ 0. Finally, at a quality of
zero and a durability of zero the marginal cost of durability is zero: c′
d(0,0) =
0.
Given the consumer’s preferences and the ﬁrm’s production technology,
the social surplus from a good with quality q and durability d is




Since a product of durability d breaks down after a time interval d, the
consumer has to repurchase the product every d periods. This implies that





























yields the socially eﬃcient quality level q∗(d) for some ﬁxed level of durability
d. Clearly, q∗ = q∗(d∗). Since the right–handside of (2) increases with d, it
follows, from the ﬁrm’s production technology, that the optimal quality q∗(d)
is increasing in d.5 As a consequence, higher durability makes quality more
socially desirable. Hence, from both a social and a productive perspective
quality and durability are complements. We want to stress this fact, be-
cause the next section argues that when quality is an experience good, this
basic economic relationship is overturned; under unobservability quality and
durability are substitutes.
Our assumptions on c(q,d) allow us to consider the extreme case that
durability is costless to provide. Since the assumption increases the trans-
parency of our arguments, Section 3 will ﬁrst focus on this extreme. In
5By the implicit function theorem we may diﬀerentiate (2) with respect to d and ﬁnd
∂q∗/∂d = (e−dr − c′′
qd)/c′′
qq > 0.
6Section 3 we, therefore, express the cost function simply as c(q). Section 4
explicitly shows that qualitative results remain unchanged under the more
natural assumption that costs depend on durability.
If durability is costless to provide, the social surplus S(q,d) is maximized
for a product of indeﬁnite durability (d∗ = ∞). Consequently, the ﬁrst best








When quality q and durability d are both observable, a competitive market
ends up producing the ﬁrst best eﬃcient good (q∗,d∗) and pricing it at its
marginal costs p = c(q∗). In our simple setup with inelastic demand, it
is immediate that also a monopolist chooses eﬃcient durability d∗.6 More
precisely, the monopolist produces the eﬃcient good (q∗,d∗) and charges the
monopoly price pm = v(q∗,d∗). Hence, under full observability our model
does not generate planned obsolescence.
This section demonstrates that we obtain planned obsolescence if we only
change our assumption concerning the observability of quality q. In partic-
ular, we assume that the consumer cannot observe the producer’s quality q
before purchase; he observes it only after consumption. In the terminology
of Nelson (1970), the producer oﬀers an experience good. As the consumer
cannot observe the quality at the time of purchase, he will form some beliefs
qe about it. Since the consumer observes the price p and durability d, his
beliefs qe may, in general, depend on these observations.7 Formally, the belief
qe(d,p) is a function qe : I R
2
+ → I R+.
Now suppose that the ﬁrm oﬀers a good with eﬃcient durability, i.e., with
an indeﬁnite durability (d = ∞). In this case, the consumer needs to purchase
6Swan (1970) shows that even when demand is elastic, a monopolist chooses the eﬃcient
level of durability d∗.
7Section 4 explicitly demonstrates that planned obsolescence also obtains when dura-
bility is also unobservable at the time of purchase.
7the good at most once. For goods with indeﬁnite durability, there exists no
equilibrium in which the producer chooses a positive quality level and the
consumer buys the product. Indeed, if such an equilibrium existed, it would
mean that the producer chooses some quality ˜ q > 0, sold it at some price ˜ p,
and the consumer’s belief qe(∞, ˜ p) was such that v(∞,qe(˜ p,∞)) ≥ ˜ p. This
cannot be an equilibrium, because, given the consumer’s beliefs and behavior,
the producer could have gained by producing the good (q,d) = (0,∞) and
charging the price ˜ p.
If the ﬁrm produces a good with a ﬁnite durability, d < ∞, the consumer
must renew his purchase every d periods. The good’s limited lifetime thereby
changes the game into an inﬁnitely repeated game. From the theory of
inﬁnitely repeated games it is well known that, depending on the discount
factor, positive levels of quality may be sustainable. By using appropriate
trigger strategies the consumer induces the ﬁrm to provide adequate levels
of quality. This section investigates this idea and studies to what extent the
possibility of repeated purchases may sustain positive levels of quality.
Formally, we consider a repeated game that is preceded by an initial stage,
where the seller chooses some observable, ﬁxed durability d. The assumption
that durability is observable and chosen once–and–for–all at the beginning
of the game is made for expositional reasons only. Section 4 explicitly shows
that these two assumptions are inconsequential.
After durability has been chosen, the seller and buyer play an inﬁnitely
repeated version of the following stage game: First, the seller sets a price p.
Upon observing the price p, the buyer decides whether to buy the product.
In case the buyer buys, the producer selects a quality q, produces the good
(q,d), and incurs the costs c(q). Thus, in each stage game the seller chooses
as her strategy a price p ≥ 0 and an unobservable quality q ≥ 0, and the
buyer’s strategy, b ∈ {0,1}, is to buy (b = 1) or not to buy (b = 0) the






p − c(q) if b = 1;





v(q,d) − p if b = 1;
0 if b = 0.
8We may now construct the supergame Γs(d) where the seller and the buyer
play the stage game Γ(d) every d periods. Since each stage lasts for d periods,
the eﬀective discount factor in the supergame Γs(d) is δ = e−rd.
Within this framework we identify the combinations (¯ d, ¯ q) such that the
supergame Γs(¯ d) has an equilibrium outcome for which in each round the
seller chooses ¯ q, and some price p ≥ 0, and the buyers always buys. Apply-
ing the arguments of Abreu (1988), we may identify the set of sustainable
combinations (¯ d, ¯ q) by considering the following trigger strategies:
Strategy σs(¯ p, ¯ q): In the ﬁrst period, the seller sets a price ¯ p and chooses
a quality ¯ q if the buyer decides to buy. As long as the seller and the buyer
have chosen (q,p,b) = (¯ q, ¯ p,1) in all previous stages, the seller continues to
choose a price p = ¯ p and a quality q = ¯ q. Otherwise, he chooses p = q = 0.
Strategy σb(¯ p, ¯ q): As long as the seller and the buyer have chosen
(q,p,b) = (¯ q, ¯ p,1) in all previous stages and the seller choose p = ¯ p in the
current period, the buyer buys, i.e., chooses b = 1. Otherwise, he chooses
b = 0.
The strategies σs(¯ p, ¯ q) and σb(¯ p, ¯ q) pin down behavior for any possible
history in the game. They imply two modes of play: a cooperative mode
during which the players choose (q,p,b) = (¯ q, ¯ p,1) and a punishment mode
with (q,p,b) = (0,0,0).
The strategies (σb(¯ p, ¯ q),σs(¯ p, ¯ q)) yield the outcome q = ¯ q, p = ¯ p, and
b = 1 with payoﬀs




i (v(¯ q,d) − ¯ p) =
v(¯ q,d) − ¯ p
1 − δ
; (3)
for the buyer and




i (¯ p − c(¯ q)) =




We now derive the conditions under which the strategy combination
(σb(¯ p, ¯ q),σs(¯ p, ¯ q)) constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium of the supergame
9Γs(d). By the single deviation principle it is suﬃcient to consider only sin-
gle deviations. That is, one must verify that players may not gain from
a single deviation in the cooperative or in the punishment phase. Since
(q,p,b) = (0,0,0) is a subgame perfect equilibrium of Γs(d), players have no
incentive to deviate in the punishment mode.
If the buyer deviates in the cooperative mode by playing b = 0, it yields
the buyer a payoﬀ of zero. Hence, the buyer has no incentive to deviate
whenever Ub(q,d,p) ≥ 0. Or, equivalently, whenever
¯ p ≤ ph(¯ q,d) ≡ v(¯ q,d) = (1 − δ)¯ q/r. (5)
Similarly, if the seller deviates in the cooperative mode, i.e., oﬀers a
quality diﬀerent from ¯ q, he receives a payoﬀ




t0 = ¯ p − c(q). (6)
Hence, the deviation that maximizes his payoﬀ is q = 0, leading to the payoﬀ
¯ p. It follows that the seller does not want to deviate if expression (4) exceeds
¯ p. That is, if
¯ p ≥ pl(¯ q,d) ≡ c(¯ q)/δ. (7)
We conclude that the supergame Γs(d) has an equilibrium in which the
combination (d,q) is sustainable if ph(d,q) ≥ pl(d,q). Recalling that δ = e−dr
this is equivalent to
f(q,d|r) ≡ (1 − e
−dr)e
−drq − c(q)r ≥ 0. (8)
It therefore follows that, for a given interest rate r > 0, the set
C(r) ≡ {(q,d)|f(q,d|r) ≥ 0} (9)
describes all sustainable combinations (q,d).
In order to identify the extreme combinations of (q,d), let q(d) denote







Figure 1: Sustainable product characteristics (q,d).
equality. In case there are multiple solutions, we are interested in the largest
level of quality q.8 Hence, we deﬁne
q(d) ≡ max
q {q|f(q,d|r) = 0}.
Given a durability d, the curve q(d) describes the maximum quality q that
is sustainable. The following lemma shows that the function q(d) is well–
deﬁned for d ∈ (0,∞) and attains a unique maximum.
Lemma 1 The curve q(d) is continuous and diﬀerentiable on d ∈ (0,∞). It
is single peaked and attains a unique maximum of ˆ q at ˆ d = ln2/r, where ˆ q
satisﬁes ˆ q = 4rc(ˆ q) .
The proof of the lemma is relegated to the appendix. Figure 1 illustrates it
graphically. Starting in (0,0) the curve q(d) ﬁrst increases and then decreases.
This is due to two opposing eﬀects. On the one hand, an increase in durability
raises the buyer’s willingness to pay, because, due to the product’s longer
lifetime, the overall utility which the buyer derives from it is higher. Hence,
a higher durability enables the producer to charge higher prices so that the
buyer’s threat not to buy the good if the producer cheats is larger. Due to the
stronger threats, higher levels of quality are sustainable. On the other hand,
the increased durability implies that the buyer interacts less often with the
8E.g., (8) is satisﬁed with equality for any d whenever q = 0.
11producer. Consequently, the buyer cannot react as quickly, when he realizes
that the producer has not chosen the appropriate quality level. Hence, we
obtain two opposing eﬀects. An increase in durability raises, due to the ﬁrst
eﬀect, the eﬀectiveness of threats, but lowers it, due to the second eﬀect.
The lemma shows that, when durability is low, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates.
As durability rises, the second eﬀect increases in relative importance. At a
durability level ˆ d the two eﬀects cancel out. For larger levels of durability
the second eﬀect dominates and the curve q(d) is decreasing.
The set C(r) identiﬁes the sustainable combinations (q,d). The decreas-
ing part of the curve q(d) implies that durability and quality are substitutes.
For larger levels of durability, one can only increase the good’s quality if dura-
bility is reduced and vice versa. This contradicts our earlier observation that,
under observability, durability and quality are complements. Hence, unob-
servability changes the economic relationship between durability and quality
from complements to substitutes. It confronts the parties with a trade–oﬀ
between quality and durability.
With respect to this trade–oﬀ, we may identify the constrained (sec-
ond best) eﬃcient solution (q∗∗,d∗∗,p∗∗) that maximizes the social welfare
S(q,d) under the condition that p∗∗ sustains the combination (q∗∗,d∗∗) as an




S(q,d) s.t. p ∈ [pl(q,d),ph(q,d)]. (10)
The next proposition characterizes the solution.
Proposition 1 Whenever quality is unobservable, the constrained eﬃcient
solution (q∗∗,d∗∗,p∗∗) exhibits d∗∗ < d∗, q∗∗ < q∗(d∗∗) < q∗. It is fully char-





∗∗)) − 1 =
 
1 − 4rc(q∗∗)/q∗∗.
The proposition shows that in the second best both durability and quality










Figure 2: Unique second best eﬃcient characteristics (q∗∗,d∗∗).
q∗(d∗∗) < q∗, the quality level q∗∗ is distorted in two ways. It is suboptimally
low, because d∗∗ itself is lower (q∗(d∗∗) < q∗), but it is also suboptimally
low given the durability level of d∗∗ (q∗∗ < q∗(d∗∗)). A formal proof of this
result is relegated to the appendix, but a heuristic argument can be given
on the basis of Figure 2. The ﬁgure draws the set C(r) of sustainable pairs
(q,d) in relation to the iso–surplus functions. At the optimum (q∗∗,d∗∗),
the corresponding iso–surplus curve I(q∗∗,d∗∗) is necessarily tangent to the
curve q(d). Since the slope of q(d) is negative but ﬁnite, the iso–surplus
curve I(q∗∗,d∗∗) is also ﬁnitely decreasing at (q∗∗,d∗∗). In contrast, the curve
I(q∗(d∗∗),d∗∗), which runs through the point (q∗(d∗∗),d∗∗), has, necessarily, an
inﬁnite slope at (q∗(d∗∗),d∗∗). From this it follows that q∗∗ < q∗(d∗∗). Since
q∗(d) is increasing in d and d∗∗ < d∗ = ∞ it further follows that q∗(d∗∗) < q∗.
The proposition tells us what combination would be chosen by a social
planner. In the remainder of this section we argue that this outcome is also
an equilibrium outcome under both a monopoly and competition. First,
we consider the monopoly setting. A monopolist will try to maximize his
proﬁts Us(q,d,p), but the consumer may ﬁnd the quality q only credible for




Us(q,d,p) s.t. p ∈ [pl(q,d),ph(q,d)]. (11)
Since Us(q,d,p) is increasing in p, it is optimal for the monopolist to charge
the price p = ph(q,d). Substitution yields Us(q,d,ph(q,d)) = S(q,d). Ef-
fectively, the monopolist’s maximization problem coincides with the social
planner’s maximization problem (10). We therefore arrive at the following
result.
Proposition 2 Suppose there exists a monopolist who operates with a cost
function c(q). Then there exist an equilibrium outcome, where in each round
the consumer buys a good with characteristics (q∗∗,d∗∗) at a price p∗∗. The
equilibrium proﬁt of the monopolist is Us(q∗∗,d∗∗,p∗∗).
Finally we argue that, by a straightforward extension of the consumer’s
trigger strategy σb(p∗∗,q∗∗), the outcome (q∗∗,d∗∗,p∗∗) is also an equilibrium
outcome with competition. To make this more precise, let there be n ﬁrms,
who each can produce a good (q,d) with the same cost function c(q). In
period 0 each producer i = 1,...,n ﬁxes its level of durability di. In pe-
riod 1 each producer i makes an oﬀer pi to the consumer. Subsequently, the
consumer may accept some oﬀer pj of producer j. The selected producer j
then select a quality qj and incurs the production cost c(qj). The consumer
observes the quality qj only after consuming the good. Since the other pro-
ducers, i  = j, need not produce, they incur zero production costs. A new
round begins after di periods, in which each producer i chooses a new price
pi upon which the buyer bases his decision whether and at which producer
to repurchase the good. The selected producer chooses its quality, etc., etc.
Now consider the following straightforward extension of the consumer’s
trigger strategy σb(p∗∗,q∗∗). After observing durabilities (d1,...,dn) and
prices (p1,...,pn) of the diﬀerent ﬁrms, the consumer only buys from a pro-
ducer who oﬀers a durability d∗∗ at a price p∗∗. If k > 1 producers oﬀer
durability d∗∗ at a price p∗∗, the consumer randomizes between these k ﬁrms
and singles out one speciﬁc producer j. The consumer continues to buy from
this producer j only if all previous goods match the quality level q∗∗ and
14producer j keeps on charging the price p∗∗. Otherwise, the consumer stops
buying altogether.
Against this extended trigger strategy of the consumer, the durability
choice d∗∗ and playing strategy σs(p∗∗,q∗∗) in any ensuing subgame is an
optimal response of a ﬁrm i. Note that the strategy’s optimality is indepen-
dent of the strategies of rival ﬁrms. Yet, in equilibrium, all ﬁrms choose the
same strategy consisting of durability choice d∗∗ and the strategy σ(p∗∗,q∗∗).
Against these strategies of the ﬁrms, the consumer’s strategy is indeed op-
timal. Hence, we obtain an equilibrium in which the consumer consumes
a good (q∗∗,d∗∗) each period and the ex ante expected proﬁt of a ﬁrm is
Us(q∗∗,d∗∗,p∗∗)/n. We summarize these ﬁndings in the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 3 Suppose there exist n producers who compete with identical
cost functions c(q). Then there exist an equilibrium outcome, where in each
round the consumer buys a good with characteristics (q∗∗,d∗∗) at a price p∗∗.
The equilibrium proﬁt of a ﬁrm is Us(q∗∗,d∗∗,p∗∗)/n.
4 Unobservable and Costly Durability
This section explicitly shows that the results of the previous section also ob-
tain under the more natural assumptions that 1) durability is costly to pro-
vide and 2) durability is an experience good that is chosen anew every period
and only observed after consumption. We show that these assumptions yield
again a trade–oﬀ between quality and durability that leads to ineﬃciently
low levels of durability and quality. However, since costly durability makes
the problem less tractable, the analysis is more abstract.
Following the analysis of the previous section, we may establish that
a combination (q,d) is sustainable if and only if pl(q,d) ≡ c(q,d)/δd ≤
ph(q,d) ≡ q(1 − δd)/(1 − δ) with δ = e−rd. That is, whenever
f(q,d|r) ≡ (1 − e
−dr)e
−drq − c(q,d)r ≥ 0.
The set of sustainable pairs (q,d) is therefore
C(r) =
 
(q,d) ∈ I R
2
+ | f(q,d|r) ≥ 0
 
.
15As in the previous section, the function f(q,d) and the set C(r) play a crucial
role. We therefore ﬁrst study their structure and properties.
As before, we are interested in the curve q(d) that is implicitly deﬁned as
f(q(d),d|r) = 0.
A ﬁrst lemma conﬁrms that there actually exists a curve q(d) in the positive
quadrant I R
2
+. Consequently, the set of sustainable combinations, C(r), is
nonempty.
Lemma 2 There exists a curve q(d) that is increasing at d = 0.
A second lemma shows that whenever a durability of degree ¯ d is sustain-
able with some quality ¯ q, then a lower quality level, q < ¯ q, is also sustainable
with durability level ¯ d. Combining this result with the previous lemma im-
plies that there exists a unique curve q(d) with the property q(d) > 0.
Lemma 3 If (¯ q, ¯ d) ∈ C(r) with ¯ q > 0, then f(q, ¯ d|r) > 0 and (q, ¯ d) ∈ C(r)
for all q ∈ (0, ¯ q).
We may now demonstrate the trade–oﬀ between durability and quality.
In particular, the following result shows that for larger levels of durability
the curve q(d) is decreasing. Hence, we ﬁnd again that durability and quality
are substitutes.
Proposition 4 The curve q(d) is decreasing for d ≥ ln2/r.
With costly durability the ﬁrst best eﬃcient level of durability may be
ﬁnite. This raises the possibility that the eﬃcient combination (q∗,d∗) lies in
the sustainable set C(r). In this case, the second best eﬃcient combination
(q∗∗,d∗∗) coincides with the ﬁrst best eﬃcient combination (q∗,d∗) and we
should not see downward distortions on durability. Indeed, this will occur in
two economicly relevant situations. First, when the consumer values dura-
bility much more than other quality characteristics and, second, when the
provision of durability is relatively expensive as compared to the discount
rate r.
16Hence, the explicit consideration of costly durability does not invalidate
our theory. Instead, it highlights that our theory becomes relevant when
consumers appreciate other quality characteristics than durability alone and
when durability is not too costly to provide. Under such circumstances the
ﬁrst best eﬃcient combination (q∗,d∗) will not be attainable and our trade–
oﬀ becomes relevant. It leads to distortions both in the durability and the
quality dimension.
5 Conclusion and Discussion
When quality is an experience good, reduced durability provides stronger
incentives for the provision of quality. This leads to lower levels of durability
than in a ﬁrst best world where quality is observable. From a ﬁrst best
perspective, we may interpret these lower levels of durability as a planned
obsolescence of consumption goods. Our theory is relevant in markets where
durability is not too costly and consumers appreciate other quality aspects
than durability alone. We view the market for portable media players as
an example of such a market and motivated our theory with the artiﬁcially
limited lifetime of Apple’s iPod.
Our theory is based on the almost tautological idea that planned ob-
solescence implies that consumers have to repurchase their products more
often. Consequently, it increases the speed at which consumers can retaliate
against a producer who fails to deliver appropriate quality. Faster means of
retaliation create stronger incentives for the producer not to cheat and these
stronger incentives enable the producer to provide higher quality. Thus, we
conclude that planned obsolescence acts as an incentive device for unobserv-
able quality.
We formalized our arguments in a stylized model where the only way
to induce appropriate quality was repeated purchases by a consumer. Yet,
our observation that obsolescence is an incentive device for quality remains
also valid if a ﬁrm’s reputation is based on diﬀerent mechanisms. For ex-
ample, word–of–mouth communication is often regarded as an additional
channel by which a ﬁrm may establish a reputation. For our theory, it
17is irrelevant whether a consumer bases his repurchase decision on his own
experiences or, through word–of–mouth, on the past experience of other con-
sumers. Increased obsolescence means that, in a given period, there will be
more consumers who need a new product. This larger group of consumers
can retaliate more forcefully when they learn, by word–of–mouth, that a pro-
ducer cheated in some previous period. It makes cheating less proﬁtable and
reputation more eﬀective.
Eﬀectively, we argue that durability aﬀects the discount factor in a re-
peated game and thereby the potential for cooperation. In the world of Klein
and Leﬄer (1981), this insight yields a theory of planned obsolescence. How-
ever, our idea may also be utilized in other repeated games. For instance,
we may apply it to the literature on implicit or relational contracting, where
the enforcement of contracts is explicitly based on a repeated games argu-
ment (e.g., MacLeod and Malcomson 1989, Levin 2003). In these contexts,
one may view the durability of a contract as determining the frequency at
which contracting parties may discipline opportunistic behavior and our idea
provides an argument in favor of short term contracting.
Appendix




−drq = c(q)r (12)
deﬁnes q as a function of d everywhere on (0,∞) provided that for any (d0,q0)





But this follows from
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rc′(q) − (1 − e−dr)e−dr (14)
18Inequality (13) implies that the denominator is positive. The sign of q′(d)
coincides with the sign of its numerator. Consequently, q′(d) is positive for
e−dr > 1/2 and negative for e−dr < 1/2. This implies that q(d) obtains a
unique maximum at




Substitution of ˆ d into (12) yields
ˆ q = 4rc(ˆ q). (15)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: Let (q∗∗,d∗∗) represent a solution to Problem (10).
The objective function S(q,d) is increasing in d. This implies, ﬁrst, that the
constraint (8) is binding at the optimum so that (q∗∗,d∗∗) lies on the curve



















The ﬁrst order condition w.r.t. q yields the optimality condition
Π
′(q) = 0 ⇒ 2r(c(q)/q + c
′(q)) − 1 =
 
1 − 4rc(q)/q. (17)
with the corresponding second order derivative
Π
′′(q) = −
2r(c(q) − qc′(q))2 + q2(q − 4rc(q))c′′(q)
(q(q − 4rc(q)))3/2 . (18)
From c′′(q) > 0 it follows that q/c(q) is decreasing in q. Hence for all q < ˆ q,
it follows from (15) that q/c(q) > ˆ q/c(ˆ q) = 4r. Hence, the numerator and
denominator in (18) are positive and, therefore, Π′′(q) < 0 for all q < ˆ q. As
a consequence, the second order condition is satisﬁed for any q < ˆ q and the
derivative Π′(q) is falling in q for q ∈ (0, ˆ q). But then, since limq→0Π′(q) =
1/r > 0 and limq→ˆ q Π′(q) = −∞, there must, due to continuity, exist a
19q∗∗ ∈ (0, ˆ q) such that Π′(q∗∗) = 0. Since q∗∗ satisﬁes the ﬁrst and second
order condition, it is a maximizer of Π(q). Finally, d∗∗ = d(q∗∗) > 0.
Since d∗ = ∞, the existence of a ﬁnite solution (q∗∗,d∗∗) implies that
d∗∗ < d∗. As q∗(d) is increasing in d, it follows q∗(d∗∗) < q∗(d∗) = q∗. It
remains to prove that q∗∗ < q∗(d∗∗).
First, from (2) it follows
e




Since d∗∗ > ˆ d = ln2/r, equality (19) implies c′(q∗(d∗∗)) > 1/(2r). Second,









∗∗)) − 1 =
 
1 − 4c(q∗∗)r/q∗∗. (21)









∗∗ > 0. (22)
Since c′′(.) > 0, this implies q∗∗ < q∗(d∗∗). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: The curve q(d) is increasing at d = 0 if q′(0) =





























qq ≥ 0. Combining this with
c′′
qd ≤ 0 implies that the square root exists. Moreover, the denominator of
the expression is positive so that the sign of q′(0) depends on the sign of
the numerator. The numerator may be rewritten as a ±
√
a2 − b, where
20a ≡ 1 − c′′
qd(0,0) > 0 and b ≡ c′′
dd(0,0)c′′
qq(0,0) > 0. Hence, the positive root
is positive, because a +
√
a2 − b ≥ a > 0. Consequently, q′(0) > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: From c′












and, therefore, c(q,d)/q is increasing in q. Let (¯ q, ¯ d) ∈ C(r). Then, for any










Therefore, f(q, ¯ d) ≥ f(¯ q, ¯ d) ≥ 0 and (q, ¯ d) ∈ C(r) whenever (¯ q, ¯ d) ∈ C(r).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: By the implicit function theorem, q(d) is well de-
ﬁned and diﬀerentiable whenever f′
q(q(d),d)  = 0. For d > 0, this follows from
f′
q(q(d),d) = (1−e−dr)e−dr−rc′
q(q(d),d) < (1−e−dr)e−dr−rc(q(d),d)/q(d) =








(2e−dr − 1)e−drqr − rc′
d(q,d)
rc′
q(q,d) − (1 − e−dr)e−dr
Due to c′
q(q,d) > c(q,d)/q = (1 − e−dr)e−dr/r, the denominator of q′(d) is
positive. The sign of q′(d) coincides therefore with the sign of the numerator,
which for d > ln2/r is negative. Q.E.D.
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